Setting the record straight: System justification and rigidity‐of‐the‐right in contemporary Hungarian politics by Jost, John T. & Kende, Anna
International Journal of Psychology
International Journal of Psychology, 2020
Vol. 55, No. S1, 96–115, DOI: 10.1002/ijop.12631
Setting the record straight: System justification
and rigidity-of-the-right in contemporary
Hungarian politics
John T. Jost1 and Anna Kende2
1Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York, USA
2Department of Social Psychology, ELTE, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary
D espite international concern about the resurgence of right-wing authoritarianism and xenophobic prejudicethroughout Central and Eastern Europe, researchers have argued recently that rightists may be less cogni-
tively rigid and system-justifying than liberals and leftists in the context of Hungary (Kelemen, Szabó, Mészáros,
László, & Forgas, 2014; Lönnqvist, Szabó, & Kelemen, 2019). We identify shortcomings of the research on
which these claims are based and provide evidence that “rigidity-of-the-right” does indeed characterise contempo-
rary Hungarian politics. Specifically, we hired professional survey firms to administer measures of personal needs
for order and structure, system justification and political orientation to two large, nationally representative sam-
ples in Hungary. Results revealed that self-identified rightists scored higher than leftists on needs for order and
structure and system justification (Study 1, N = 1005) and that supporters of right-wing parties (Fidesz and Job-
bik) scored higher on both general and economic system justification than supporters of liberal and leftist parties
(Study 2, N = 886). In exploratory analyses, we also observed that rightists expressed more intolerance than leftists
toward groups that are commonly mistreated in Eastern Europe, including the Roma, religious minorities and sexual
minorities.
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In The Authoritarian Personality, one of the most influ-
ential and widely debated works in the history of social
science, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Stan-
ford (1950) proposed a psychodynamic theory of preju-
dice and ideology that was intended to explain why eco-
nomic frustration brought on by World War I and the
Great Depression contributed to the mass popularity of
fascist movements in Europe from the 1920s to the 1940s.
As intellectual descendants of the Frankfurt School in
Germany, which explicitly combined Marxist perspec-
tives on culture and social conflict with Freudian accounts
of personality and motivation, Adorno and his co-authors
(often referred to as “the Berkeley group”) sought to
understand the mass appeal of fascism as a product of
individual and social forces. The gist of their argument
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was that “status anxiety produces authoritarian discipline
which produces repression of faults and shortcomings
and of aggression against authority” which is then “pro-
jected onto minorities and outsiders” (Brown, 1965/2004,
p. 53).
One of the central insights of this theoretical
perspective—which has received a great deal of empir-
ical support (Altemeyer, 2006; Cunningham, Nezlek,
& Banaji, 2004; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Sidanius &
Pratto, 2001; Whitley Jr. & Kite, 2009)—is that “a man
who is hostile toward one minority group is very likely
to be hostile against a wide variety of others” (Adorno
et al., 1950, p. 9). In other words, the authoritarian is an
individual for whom generalised prejudice has become a
structured aspect of his or her personality. Presumably,
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this psychological make-up is part of what led millions
of Europeans to join extreme right-wing movements
led by the likes of Mussolini, Hitler, and Franco while
displacing their hostility toward authority figures onto
socially sanctioned scapegoats such as Jews, Roma
(also called “Gypsies”), Communists, and gay men and
lesbians.
However, the work of Adorno et al. (1950) came under
intense criticism for (a) methodological flaws, especially
the problem of confounding authoritarianism with acqui-
escent response styles, and (b) its unapologetic focus on
right-wing authoritarianism (Brown, 2004). With respect
to the first issue, Altemeyer, 2004, 2006 reinvigorated the
study of authoritarianism by developing new, psychomet-
rically improved scales for measuring right-wing author-
itarianism and more thoroughly exploring its personality
correlates and political implications. With regard to the
second issue, the original work by Adorno et al. (1950)
documented strong correlations between authoritarianism
and political-economic conservatism. Nevertheless, crit-
ics of The Authoritarian Personality have long claimed
that liberals and leftists are every bit as dogmatic and rigid
as conservatives and rightists. Evidence for this claim has
been hard to come by. An extensive review of the early
research literature led Brown, 2004 to conclude that: “No
one thus far has shown that there is an authoritarian of the
left. Still the impression persists that such a type exists
and that some [leftists] belong to it” (p. 66). In recent
years, a few scholars have argued that rigidity-of-the-left
may be as common as—or perhaps even more com-
mon than—rigidity-of-the-right, especially in Commu-
nist and post-Communist societies (Conway III, Houck,
Gornick, & Repke, 2018; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Lön-
nqvist, Szabó, & Kelemen, 2019; Malka, Soto, Inzlicht,
& Lelkes, 2014). This is an important, albeit controver-
sial empirical issue that should be of widespread interest
to social, personality and political psychologists, and so
we address it here.
HISTORY OF AUTHORITARIANISM
IN CENTRAL/EASTERN EUROPE
In 1990, the people of Hungary—like many of their
Central and Eastern European neighbours—moved
quickly and decisively to shed their authoritarian past
and embrace the tenets of liberal democracy as practiced
in the West. Free and fair elections were held, genuine
political competition took place, citizens gained new
civil liberties that had been denied them for decades, and
journalists were able to cover national and international
news events without fear of censorship or reprisal. In
recent years, however, Hungary has come to resemble
1See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/hungary.
an authoritarian state once again under the leadership of
right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who frequently
describes his country as an “illiberal democracy.” Mem-
bers of his ruling Fidesz party have stoked anti-immigrant
sentiment and rewritten the national constitution in an
effort to maintain right-wing hegemony for years to
come. Similar political developments of a right-wing
authoritarian nature have emerged in Austria, Poland,
Latvia and Lithuania.
In early 2019, the political status of Hungary was
downgraded by Freedom House, a think tank that mon-
itors the state of democratic freedoms around the world,
from “free” to “partly free,” placing it in the same cate-
gory as Pakistan, Singapore and Zimbabwe. This bestows
upon Hungary the dubious distinction of making it the
first European Union nation to lose its democratic sta-
tus. According to Freedom House: “Hungary’s status
declined from Free to Partly Free due to sustained attacks
on the country’s democratic institutions by Prime Min-
ister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, which has used its
parliamentary supermajority to impose restrictions on or
assert control over the opposition, the media, religious
groups, academia, NGOs, the courts, asylum seekers and
the private sector since 2010.”1 The political scientist
R. Daniel Kelemen (2019) noted that “the Orbán regime
has managed to consolidate control over the judiciary
and nearly all the media, eliminate effective checks on
its power, rig the electoral system to its advantage, sti-
fle civil society organizations and even expel the coun-
try’s top independent university—the Central European
University.”
Around the same period of time, a new far-right
political party named Jobbik was launched in 2003 to
compete with Fidesz. In its early years, Jobbik politi-
cians often employed rhetoric of a blatantly racist and
anti-Semitic nature, although party leaders appear to
have settled more recently on a “moderate” agenda that
they characterise as Christian, conservative and nation-
alistic. In the parliamentary elections of 2018, Jobbik
took 19% of the national vote, making them the sec-
ond largest party (after Fidesz) to be represented in
the National Assembly. Like supporters of the Fidesz
party, Jobbik supporters express hostility toward Hun-
gary’s Roma population and take a hard line against the
acceptance of immigrants and refugees. Following a polit-
ical crisis in 2006, members of Jobbik began reposition-
ing themselves as an upstart, anti-establishment party.
Subsequently, they have mobilised millions of citizens
who were angry and disappointed with the political sit-
uation in Hungary (Lantos & Kende, 2015). Jobbik has
attracted a large number of young people, including uni-
versity students—especially first-generation university
students who came from smaller towns and rural villages
(Szabó, 2015). Other Hungarian parties in opposition
to Fidesz—including liberal-democrats, socialists and
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Green activists—are widely regarded as weak, disorgan-
ised, and ineffective.2 Their role in Hungarian political
life is largely confined to the nation’s capital, Budapest,
and is therefore rather minimal at the present time,
although left–right polarisation throughout the country is
very high by European standards (Vegetti, 2019).
The resurgence of right-wing authoritarianism in
Central and Eastern Europe raises a number of impor-
tant questions of a political psychological nature (Jost,
2017). Given Hungary’s alliance with Nazi Germany in
the 1930s and 1940s and its forced submission to the
authoritarian regime of the Soviet Union for over 40 years
subsequently, it is puzzling (and disturbing) to learn that
so many citizens appear to have embraced right-wing
authoritarianism less than 30 years after becoming a
democracy. We may ask: What are the beliefs, opinions
and values that are associated with left–right ideological
commitments in post-Communist societies? What are
the psychological characteristics that accompany them?
Are there meaningful individual differences that can help
to explain the rise of ideological conflict in Central and
Eastern Europe as well as variability in the degree of
support vs. opposition to the status quo?
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AS MOTIVATED SOCIAL
COGNITION
These are the kinds of questions that the theory of
political ideology as motivated social cognition—which
holds that there are reciprocal influences or “elective
affinities” between psychological needs and ideological
preferences—is especially well-poised to answer (e.g.,
Jost, 2006, 2017; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Jost,
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b). This the-
ory proceeds from the assumption that, as Adorno et al.
(1950) put it, “The individual’s pattern of thought, what-
ever its content, reflects his personality and is not merely
an aggregate of opinions picked up helter-skelter from the
ideological environment” (p. 176).
More than a half-century of social scientific research
suggests that there is a relatively close connection
between feelings of threat and aversion to uncertainty
or ambiguity, on one hand, and politically conservative,
authoritarian, and xenophobic reactions, on the other
hand (e.g., Altemeyer, 2004, 2006; Doty, Peterson,
& Winter, 1991; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Hofstadter,
1965; Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017; Sales, 1973;
Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Wilson, 1973). Because most
of this research has been conducted in Western soci-
eties, relatively little is known about the psychological
2For instance, the late Ágnes Heller wrote in 2017: “The oppositional parties are weak. All of them. Not just the Socialist party, split in two, sitting
as impotent opposition in the Parliament, as well as the Green Party (LMP) and the four small liberal parties. The attempt of some parties to join forces
in 2014 failed miserably. At present all of them are aware of the impending danger—the possible demise of them all in 2018. Yet they still are unable
to make up their mind whether they want to win the next elections, or want rather to sit in the parliament as lame ducks” (Heller, 2017, p. 543).
underpinnings of left–right ideology in post-Communist
countries (but see Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout,
2007, for one attempt to address the question).
The observation that, on average, people who iden-
tify more with the political right than left tend to exhibit
higher levels of fear and cognitive and perceptual rigidity,
dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity and epistemic needs
for order, simplicity, structure and closure is sometimes
referred to as the “rigidity-of-the-right” phenomenon. As
noted above, rigidity-of-the-right has been observed con-
sistently throughout North America and Western Europe
(e.g., Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b; Kemmelmeier,
2007; Rokeach, 1960; Tetlock, 1984, 2007; Tetlock,
Bernzweig, & Gallant, 1985), but studies conducted
in Central and Eastern Europe have been few and far
between.
In terms of other elective affinities, many studies con-
ducted in the West indicate that (a) the desire to believe in
a just world in which “people deserve what they get and
get what they deserve” and (b) the motivational tendency
to defend and justify the legitimacy of existing social, eco-
nomic, and political institutions and arrangements (i.e.,
system justification) help to explain the psychological
appeal of conservative and rightist ideas, opinions, and
leaders (e.g., Furnham, 2003; Jost, 2019; Jost & Hun-
yady, 2005; Lerner, 1980; Rubin & Peplau, 1975). Sys-
tem justification shares some features in common with
authoritarianism, including “an attachment to ‘things as
they are,’ a resistance to social change,” and an ide-
ological commitment to “the status quo, religion, and
tradition” (Brown, 2004, p. 43). The endorsement of
system-justifying beliefs is typically associated with high
levels of trust in governmental and other societal institu-
tions, including Big Business, and this has been observed
in both Eastern and Western contexts (e.g., Cichocka &
Jost, 2014; Hunyady, 2018; Intawan & Nicholson, 2018;
Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, &
Sullivan, 2003). Recent research also suggests that system
justification is generally associated with support for main-
stream (or establishment) political parties and candidates
rather than ideologically extreme parties and candidates
(Langer, Vasilopoulos, & Jost, 2019).
PRIOR RESEARCH ON POLITICAL
PSYCHOLOGY IN HUNGARY
The question of whether leftists or rightists in Hungary
were more cognitively rigid and authoritarian imme-
diately following the transition from Communism (or
socialism) to a capitalist-democratic system was taken up
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by Todosijevic´ and Enyedi (2008) in a ground-breaking
study that compared data from 1994, 1997, 2000 and
2002. A number of useful conclusions were reached.
First, the results revealed that there was a statistically
significant positive association between rightist identifi-
cation and authoritarianism, providing modest support for
the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis. Furthermore, people
who described themselves as Christian, nationalist and
populist tended to score higher on authoritarianism,
whereas those who described themselves as liberal,
democratic and socialist tended to score lower on author-
itarianism. Second, there was also a significant positive
association between ideological extremity (whether left
or right) and authoritarianism, consistent with observa-
tions taken in the West. The conjoint effects of these two
patterns were nearly identical to what has been observed
in North American and Western European contexts,
namely that extreme leftists were more authoritarian than
centre-leftists, but extreme rightists were more authoritar-
ian than extreme leftists, and centre-rightists were more
authoritarian than centre-leftists (see Jost et al., 2003b).
In other words, there was no evidence—during these
years, at least— that leftists were more cognitively rigid
than rightists in the Eastern European context, as argued
by Greenberg and Jonas (2003), Malka et al. (2014), and
Lönnqvist et al. (2019).
Another useful (and prescient) observation that comes
from the analysis by Todosijevic´ and Enyedi (2008) is
that between 1994 and 2002 supporters of the Fidesz
party not only moved to the right in terms of their ide-
ological identification but also increased substantially in
terms of their levels of authoritarianism. Supporters of
liberal and socialist parties, by contrast, did not change
in terms of ideological identification or authoritarianism
during this period. These findings, too, are consistent
with the notion that—as the Communist legacy recedes
further into the past—citizens of Eastern Europe come
to increasingly resemble citizens of Western Europe in
terms of their political psychology: we see that ideologi-
cal rigidity-of-the-right eclipses rigidity-of-the-left (con-
trary to the suggestion of Greenberg & Jonas, 2003).
Since the emergence of the right-wing Jobbik party in
2003, political psychologists in Hungary have sought to
understand the basis of their appeal. Studies show that
Jobbik supporters are disproportionately male, young and
distrusting of democratic institutions, and they tend to
reside in the poorest regions of the country, although
they are not themselves among the very poorest (Bernát,
Juhász, Krekó, & Molnár, 2013; Hunyady, 2018; Krekó,
Juhász, & Molnár, 2011). Rightists in Hungary, including
Jobbik supporters, express higher levels of ethnocentrism,
intolerance, and prejudice, especially directed at Jews and
the Roma population, and they tend to see political vio-
lence as more justified than other citizens do (Bartlett,
Birdwell, Krekó, Benfield, & Gyori, 2012; Bernát et al.,
2013; Faragó, Kende, & Krekó, 2019; Krekó et al., 2011).
Taken in conjunction, these findings are not only at odds
with the notion that leftists in Eastern Europe are more
rigid, authoritarian, and anti-democratic than their right-
ist counterparts. They are also at odds with the notion
that liberals and leftists are equally prejudiced, intolerant
and ethnocentric, in comparison with conservatives and
rightists, as a number of scholars have argued recently
(e.g., Brandt, 2017; Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford,
&Wetherell, 2014; Crawford, 2012; Crawford&Pilanski,
2014; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013).
THE NEW CASE FOR RIGIDITY-OF-THE-LEFT
IN THE HUNGARIAN CONTEXT
Despite the fact that numerous studies conducted in the
21st century have supported the rigidity-of-the-right
hypothesis, there have been two articles pub-
lished recently that have sought to resurrect the
rigidity-of-the-left argument in the case of Hungary.
Both articles seem to be based on the same survey of
1000 Hungarian adults that was conducted in April 2010.
An article by Lönnqvist et al. (2019) reported analyses
based on need for cognition, authoritarianism, just world
beliefs, system justification and political party affiliation.
The authors concluded on the basis of these analyses that
supporters of the far-right Jobbik Party in their sample
(n = 124) were more open-minded than supporters of all
other political parties in Hungary and that the results of
their study therefore contradicted the rigidity-of-the-right
hypothesis, which has received so much support in other
countries (e.g., Jost, 2017; Tetlock, 2007). However,
there are several good reasons to doubt the conclusions
drawn on the basis of these analyses.
To begin with, Lönnqvist et al. (2019) present findings
that are based on the analysis of individual items rather
than complete scales, apparently after dropping some
items following factor analyses conducted on the same
data set (see Kelemen et al., 2014, p. 203). For instance,
with respect to authoritarianism the researchers report
results based on a mean of four items, including two items
drawn from Adorno et al.’s (1950) Fascism (or F-) scale
(which originally contained 30 items) plus 2 new items
apparently constructed by Kelemen et al. (2014). Aggre-
gating across these four items, Lönnqvist et al. report that
supporters of Jobbik had the highest overall mean score
with respect to authoritarianism (M = 3.19, SD = 0.51),
and supporters of Jobbik scored very slightly (but sig-
nificantly) higher than supporters of Fidesz (M = 3.08,
SD = 0.48, n = 334) but not supporters of the Socialist
(MSZP) Party (M = 3.11, SD = 0.52, n = 95). These find-
ings, which reveal that supporters of all three parties
scored slightly above the scale mid-point on four author-
itarianism items—do not provide a solid empirical jus-
tification for rejecting the notion that rightists are more
cognitively rigid than leftists. Nevertheless, the authors
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conclude that their “results contradict the ‘rigidity of the
right’ hypothesis” (p. 1).
Lönnqvist et al. (2019) also summarise the results of
analyses based on (a) four items used to measure the Gen-
eral Belief in a JustWorld drawn from an abridged version
of Dalbert’s (1999) subscale, and (b) five items modified
fromKay and Jost’s (2003) eight-item general system jus-
tification scale. They find that supporters of Fidesz and
the Socialist Party scored slightly higher than support-
ers of Jobbik on just world beliefs, whereas supporters of
the Socialist Party (the most longstanding party) scored
slightly higher on general system justification than sup-
porters of Fidesz (the second most longstanding party
of the three), who scored slightly higher than support-
ers of Jobbik (the newest party). On the basis of these
results, Lönnqvist et al. (2019) concluded that “JOBBIK
voters were the least satisfied with the system” and “least
inclined to believe in a globally just world” (p. 295).
Likewise, Kelemen et al. (2014) argued that—in
alleged contradiction to system justification
theory—“Hungarian people, unlike people in Western
democracies, did not justify the existing establishment”
(p. 197) and that they predominantly engaged in “system
derogation” by asserting that “the social and politi-
cal system is inherently unfair, unjust and corrupt”
(p. 212). Although other studies indicate that citizens
of post-Communist countries (including Hungary) do
indeed score lower on measures of system justification
than citizens of Western countries (Cichocka & Jost,
2014; Hunyady, 2018), the strong conclusions reached by
Kelemen et al. (2014) and Lönnqvist et al. (2019) about
widespread “system derogation” tendencies in Hungary
appear to be overstated, given the small and inconsistent
ideological differences recorded in a survey that was
conducted only a few years after the Jobbik Party was
created.
To gauge ideological differences in cognitive rigid-
ity, Lönnqvist et al. (2019) present the results of analyses
based on five items selected from Cacioppo and Petty’s
(1982) Need for Cognition scale, which contains a total
of 34 items. Lönnqvist et al. report that supporters of Job-
bik scored slightly but significantly higher on these five
items (M = 2.86, SD = 0.63) than supporters of Fidesz
(M = 2.66, SD = 0.62) and the Socialist Party (M = 2.52,
SD = 0.62), who did not differ from one another. This
finding is broadly consistent with Sidanius and Lau’s
(1989) deviance-sophistication hypothesis, which sug-
gests that (under some circumstances at least) ideo-
logical extremists may be more intellectually sophis-
ticated than supporters of mainstream political parties
and ideas, in seeming contrast to the rigidity-of-the-right
hypothesis.
The data analysed by Kelemen et al. (2014) and Lön-
nqvist et al. (2019) were collected during the 2months
prior to the April 2010 parliamentary election. This means
that the incumbent party at the time of the survey was the
Socialist Party, which had been in power since 2002 and
had lost much of its popularity following a highly pub-
licised incident in which the Prime Minister was caught
admitting that he had misled the public about the state of
the economy. These facts—that Fidesz had been out of
power, at least in terms of the executive office, for 8 years,
and that Jobbik had never been in office and had only been
in existence for 7 years—could account for the observa-
tions in previous research that supporters of these two par-
ties scored lower on a subset of system justification items
than one would expect given their right-wing orientation.
Other studies conducted in Hungary suggest that the cor-
relation between system justification and right-wing ori-
entation is positive and significant, ranging from .235 to
.369 (Jost, 2019, Table 2; see also Caricati, 2019).
Another methodological concern is that supporters
of Jobbik, which was founded as recently as 2003, are
known to be younger than supporters of Fidesz, which
was founded in 1988 (also as a youth party), and sup-
porters of the Socialist Party, which was founded in 1989
when the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party was dis-
solved (e.g., Bartlett et al., 2012; Bernát et al., 2013).
It is therefore important to take into account the effects
of age on cognitive rigidity, system justification, and
right-wing orientation, all of which are generally under-
stood to be positive and significant (e.g., see Napier &
Jost, 2008). For all of the reasons listed above—and in
light of ongoing political developments in Hungary asso-
ciated with rigidity-of-the-right that are drawing interna-
tional attention—we felt that it was important to revisit
the question of whether and, if so, how right-wing sup-
porters of Fidesz and Jobbik differ not only from sup-
porters of the Socialist Party but also supporters of the
liberal-democratic coalition and the Green Party in terms
of their psychology. The fruits of our research, in turn,
speak to much broader controversies in the research lit-
erature on political psychology, including the questions
of (a) whether or not rightists are more rigid and author-
itarian than leftists (Conway III et al., 2018; Greenberg
& Jonas, 2003; Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b; Kemmelmeier,
2007; Lönnqvist et al., 2019;Malka et al., 2014; Rokeach,
1960; Tetlock, 2007), and (b) whether or not rightists
tend to be more prejudiced, intolerant, and ethnocentric
than leftists in general (Brandt, 2017; Brandt et al., 2014;
Crawford, 2012; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Jost, 2017;
Wetherell et al., 2013).
OVERVIEW OF PRESENT RESEARCH
In two studies, we hired professional survey firms to
administer complete instruments (rather than individual
items) to measure cognitive rigidity, political orienta-
tion, system justification and out-group attitudes along
with several demographic variables, including age and
education, to large, nationally representative samples of
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Hungarian adults. Specifically, in Study 1, respondents
completed a brief version of the need for cognitive clo-
sure scale, an ideological self-placement scale, and a
Hungarian translation of the general system justification
scale. This enabled us to investigate patterns of associ-
ation among cognitive rigidity, left–right ideology, and
system justification. Respondents in Study 1 also com-
pleted feeling thermometer and social distance measures
with respect to eight target groups; this enabled us to con-
duct exploratory analyses pertaining to the question of
whether generalised prejudice among leftists and rightists
is or is not comparable.
In Study 2, respondents completed measures of ideo-
logical self-placement and preferences for specific polit-
ical parties as well as scales of general and economic
system justification. This enabled us to investigate, in
even greater detail, the nature of the relationship between
political orientation and system justification. Respondents
were also asked to indicate their “least liked group” in
the context of Hungarian society. Again, we conducted
exploratory analyses to determine whether leftists and
rightists would be equally intolerant of out-groups that
are commonlymistreated in Eastern Europe, including the
Roma, religious minorities, and sexual minorities.
All procedures performed in studies involving human
participants were in accordance with the ethical stan-
dards of the institutional research committee and with
the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments
or comparable ethical standards. Study 1 was carried out
with the IRB approval of Eötvös Loránd University, and
Study 2 with the IRB approval of New York University.
Informed consent was obtained from all individual adult




Data for Study 1 were collected in 2014 by the survey
company SoliData Ltd. using the online survey platform
“kerdoivem.hu.” The target sample size was N = 1000,
as in most other representative surveys of public opin-
ion in Hungary (see Poll of Polls, 2018). We relied on
a proportionally stratified, probabilistic sampling method
to produce a sample that was demographically similar to
the Hungarian population in terms of age, gender, level
of education and settlement type. The questionnaire was
administered in Hungarian. We used published Hungar-
ian translations of measurement instruments to the extent
that they were available; other scales were translated into
Hungarian and back-translated to English by an indepen-
dent translator. Responses were required for all items, so
there was no missing data.
Participants
The final sample size was N = 1005, all of whom fin-
ished the questionnaire. Fifty-one percent of the respon-
dents were women and 49% were men; the mean age
of participants was 41.6 years (SD = 13.3), 17.7% were
from Budapest, 21.2% from large cities, 32.2% from
smaller towns and 28.9% from villages. In terms of edu-
cation, 25% had received a university degree, 30% more
had completed their secondary education, 25% VET and
19.8% had primary education or lower.
Measures
To measure personal needs for order and structure we
administered a Hungarian translation of the 10-item sub-
scale from the need for cognitive closure scale (𝛼 = .78)
used by Kruglanski, Atash, De Grada, Mannetti, and
Pierro (1997). To measure system justification we admin-
istered Berkics’ (2009) translation of the eight-item gen-
eral system justification scale (𝛼 = .83) developed by Jost
et al. (2003). Responses to both instruments were pro-
vided on a scale ranging from 1 (“completely disagree”)
to 5 (“completely agree”). We measured political orien-
tation with a single ideological left–right self-placement
item (on a 7-point scale), as in previous research on polit-
ical psychology (e.g., Jost, 2006).
We measured subjective (or perceived)
socio-economic status (SES) using a 3-point
self-placement measure pertaining to one’s own finan-
cial situation (1 = “below average,” 2 = “average,”
3 = “above average”). The survey also included a number
of questions about out-group attitudes, including “feeling
thermometer” items on which respondents indicated
how likable on a scale from 1 (“not likable at all”) to
9 (“very likable”) they regarded eight different target
groups to be (see list of target groups in Table 3). For
the same eight groups, respondents completed a version
of Bogardus’ (1925) instrument for measuring social
distance on a scale that ranged from 1 to 6 with the fol-
lowing labels: 1 =would accept as a “family member,”
2 = “roommate,” 3 = “colleague,” 4 = “neighbour,” 5
= “resident of my town,” 6 = “would not accept as a
resident of my country.”
Results
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among major
study variables are shown in Table 1. Overall, respon-
dents scored slightly above the scale midpoint on per-
sonal needs for order and structure and slightly below
the scale midpoint in terms of general system justifica-
tion. Individuals who scored higher on needs for order
and structure tended to be older (r = .079, p = .012), more
rightist (r = .093, p = .003), and to score higher on gen-
eral system justification (r = .122, p < .001). Those who
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among major variables in Study 1
Scale M (SD) 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1 Needs for order and structure 1–5 3.77 (0.60) .122*** .093* .079* .000 −.028
2 General system justification 1–5 2.24 (0.80) — .369*** .016 .055 .138***
3 Political orientation (left to right) 1–7 4.06 (1.50) — −.167*** −.006 −.002
4 Age Years 41.6 (13.3) — .047 −.009
5 Education 1–4 2.60 (1.07) — .265***
6 Subjective SES 1–3 1.83 (0.61) —
Note. * p < .05, *** p < .001.
Figure 1. Scatter plot with linear and quadratic associations between left–right ideological self-placement and personal need for order and structure
in Study 1.
scored higher on system justification tended to be slightly
higher on subjective SES (r = .093, p = .003) and to be
more rightist in terms of political orientation (r = .369,
p < .001). Rightists were younger than leftists in this sam-
ple (r =−.167, p < .001).
There is prior evidence suggesting that, in addition to
a linear association between rightist orientation and cog-
nitive rigidity, there may also be a curvilinear association
due to the effects of ideological extremity in general. That
is, it has been observed that extreme leftists are sometimes
more rigid (and authoritarian) than centre-leftists (e.g.,
Jost et al., 2003b; Todosijevic´ & Enyedi, 2008; but see
Jost et al., 2007). We considered this possibility as well.
As shown in Figure 1, there was a very slight uptick in
the personal need for order and structure at the ideological
extremes. However, adding a quadratic term (R2 = .010)
explained very little additional variance (ΔR2 = .001),
above and beyond the linear term (R2 = .009).
Because Caricati (2019) observed that in several Euro-
pean countries there is a curvilinear association between
political orientation and system justification, we consid-
ered this possibility as well. Specifically, the research
program by Caricati suggested that there is often a drop
in system justification at the extreme right-wing end of
the ideological self-placement scale. In terms of Cen-
tral and Eastern European contexts, this pattern was
observed in the Czech Republic but not in Poland or Hun-
gary. As shown in Figure 2, we did obtain very slight
evidence of a curvilinear relationship. Although right-
ists tended to score higher on general system justifica-
tion than leftists, extreme-rightists scored slightly lower
than centre-rightists. Nevertheless, the overall association
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Figure 2. Scatter plot with linear and quadratic associations between left–right ideological self-placement and general system justification in Study 1.
should still be considered to be linear, because adding the
quadratic term (R2 = .137) explained very little additional
variance (ΔR2 = .001) after taking into account the linear
term (R2 = .136).
To further investigate the rigidity-of-the-right hypoth-
esis in the Hungarian context, we conducted a multiple
hierarchical regression analysis in which left–right polit-
ical orientation was used to predict (a) personal needs for
order and structure and (b) system justification after (c)
adjusting for the effects of age, education, and subjective
SES. With respect to the demographic variables entered
in the first step of the first model, only age was associated
with personal needs for order and structure. Older peo-
ple, as expected, scored slightly higher than younger peo-
ple (ß = .08, t = 2.50, p = .012). Overall, the three demo-
graphic variables accounted for a negligible amount of
variance in needs for order and structure (R2 = 0.004,
F(3, 1001) = 2.38, p = .069). Adding left–right polit-
ical orientation in the second step of the model sig-
nificantly increased the amount of variance explained
(ΔR2 = 0.01, F(1, 1001) = 11.87, p < .001), but the total
amount of variance explained was low in absolute terms
(R2 = 0.015, F(4, 1001) = 4.67, p < .001). In the com-
bined model, both age (ß = .10, t = 3.06, p = .002) and
right-wing orientation (ß = .11, t = 3.45, p < .001) were
positively associated with needs for order and structure,
after adjusting for other variables (see Table 2, top two
panels).
With respect to system justification, the only demo-
graphic variable that was a significant predictor in the
first step of the model was subjective SES, although the
model explained only 2% of the variance (R2 = 0.02, F(3,
1001) = 6.67, p < .001). Respondents who perceived
their financial situation in relatively favourable (vs.
unfavourable) terms were more likely to regard the social
system as legitimate and desirable (ß = .13, t = 4.09,
p < .001). Adding political orientation in the second
step of the model significantly increased the amount of
variance explained (ΔR2 = 0.14, F(1, 1000) = 169.82,
p < .001). In the combined model, age (ß = .08, t = 2.74,
p = .006), subjective SES (ß = .13, t = 4.47, p < .001),
and right-wing orientation (ß = .38, t = 13.03, p < .001)
were all positively associated with general system justi-
fication, after adjusting for other variables (see Table 2,
bottom two panels). Overall, this model explained a
significant amount of variance in system justification
(R2 = 0.16, F(4, 1001) = 48.30, p < .001).
To address the question of whether leftists and rightists
in Hungary are comparable or not in terms of ethnocentric
intolerance and prejudice, we conducted an exploratory
analysis focused on out-group attitudes. In Table 3, we
display correlations between cognitive and ideological
variables, on one hand, and attitudes toward various
social groups, on the other. Individuals who scored higher
on the personal needs for order and structure subscale
tended to have more negative attitudes toward Roma and
gay/lesbian people and to prefer more social distance with
respect to those groups as well as Jews and homeless
people. They expressed more positive attitudes toward
Transylvanians (ethnic Hungarians living in a region of
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TABLE 2
Results of a hierarchical regression model investigating the effect of left–right political orientation on personal needs for order and
structure (top panels) and general system justification beliefs (bottom panels) in Study 1
95% CI
Predictor B SE t p 𝛽 Lower Upper
Step 1 Outcome variable: Personal needs for order and structure
Intercept 3.66 .09 41.08 <.001
Age .00 .00 2.50 .012 0.08 .02 .14
Education .00 .02 0.13 .895 .00 −.06 .07
SES −.03 .03 −0.87 .383 −.03 −.09 .04
Step 2
Intercept 3.45 .11 31.95 <.001
Age .00 .00 3.06 .002 .10 .03 .16
Education .00 .02 .12 .902 .00 −.06 .07
SES −.03 .03 −0.86 .388 −0.03 −.09 .04
Political Orientation (left to right) .04 .01 3.45 <.001 .11 .05 .17
Step 1 Outcome variable: System justification
Intercept 1.84 .12 15.63 <.001
Age .01 .00 0.53 .598 .02 −.04 .08
Education .01 .02 0.59 .553 .02 −.04 .08
SES .17 .04 4.09 <.001 .13 .07 .20
Step 2
Intercept .86 .13 6.44 <.001
Age .01 .00 2.74 .006 .08 .02 .14
Education .01 .02 0.61 .544 .02 −.04 .08
SES .18 .04 4.47 <.001 .13 .08 .19
Political orientation (left to right) .20 .02 13.03 <.001 .38 .33 .44
TABLE 3









Feeling thermometer (1–9) 3.69 (1.97) −.083** −.215** .084**
Social distance (1–6) 4.00 (1.76) .152** .223** .050
Jews
Feeling thermometer (1–9) 5.21 (1.72) −.019 −.267** .016
Social distance (1–6) 2.94 (1.75) .065* .263** .003
Gays and lesbians
Feeling thermometer (1–9) 4.73 (2.00) −.110** −.281** −.086**
Social distance (1–6) 3.33 (1.68) .120** .247** .106**
Homeless people
Feeling thermometer (1–9) 4.39 (1.80) −.028 −.162** −.054
Social distance (1–6) 4.22 (1.30) .096** .154** .096**
Disabled people
Feeling thermometer (1–9) 6.37 (1.64) .087** .005 .032
Social distance (1–6) 2.39 (1.34) .007 .072** .044
Transylvanians
Feeling thermometer (1–9) 5.86 (1.90) .062* .329** .300**
Social distance (1–6) 2.62 (1.63) .017 −.148** −.151**
Obese people
Feeling thermometer (1–9) 5.35 (1.51) .013 −.020 −.001
Social distance (1–6) 2.46 (1.39) .059 .060 .052
Emigrants from Hungary (to other countries)
Feeling thermometer (1–9) 5.91 (1.61) .036 −.031 .050
Social distance (1–6) 2.37 (1.52) .029 −.024 −.004
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Romania that was once part of Hungary) and, more sur-
prisingly, disabled people. Individuals who scored higher
on the general system justification scale expressed more
negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians, but they
expressed more positive attitudes toward Transylvanians
and, also surprisingly, Roma. In terms of political orien-
tation, rightists expressed consistently more negative atti-
tudes (and preferred more social distance) with respect
to Roma, Jews, sexual minorities and homeless people,
in comparison with leftists. At the same time, rightists
expressed more positive attitudes toward Transylvanians
than did leftists. These results suggest that there are ideo-
logical differences in generalised prejudice in the context
of Hungary that resemble those observed in the West.
Discussion
In Study 1, we obtained very different results from those
reported in previous studies of political psychology in
Hungary. Unlike Lönnqvist et al. (2019), we found clear
support for the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis. Rightists
scored significantly higher than leftists on personal needs
for order and structure, even after adjusting for demo-
graphic factors such as age, education and SES. More-
over, we saw no evidence that Hungarian respondents
were extremely “system-derogating,” as Kelemen et al.
(2014) argued. Mean levels on general system justifi-
cation were slightly below the scale midpoint but well
within the range typically observed around the world
(Cichocka & Jost, 2014; see also Caricati, 2019). Impor-
tantly, rightists scored significantly higher than leftists
on a Hungarian translation of the complete general sys-
tem justification scale, even after adjusting for demo-
graphic factors such as age, education and SES. This,
too, is consistent with the results of prior research (Jost,
2019). Finally, an exploratory analysis revealed that right-
ists expressed more negative attitudes and preferred to
maintain greater social distance with respect to Roma,
Jews, sexual minorities and homeless people.
All of these findings are at odds with suggestions
made in previous articles that the popularity of right-wing
ideology in contemporary Hungary is compatible with
increased openness, flexibility and system-challenging
motivation. On the contrary, in terms of cognitive rigid-
ity and prejudice, Hungarian rightists appear to closely
resemble rightists in nearly every other country that has
been studied to date (e.g., Jost, 2006, 2017, 2019; Jost
et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2008, 2009, 2017). In Study 2, we
focused more specifically on political party affiliations,
which enabled us to compare supporters of the two most
popular right-wing parties, Fidesz and Jobbik, to support-
ers of other parties in Hungary.
3Study 2 was conducted as part of a broader project in collaboration with Ruthie Pliskin and Eran Halperin on “Ideological Differences in Emotion





For Study 2, we hired a polling firm named Medián
Opinion & Market Research Ltd. to conduct an online
survey in 2017 using the Qualtrics platform. Once again,
we targeted a sample size of approximately N = 1000,
using a proportionally stratified, probabilistic sampling
method, with the goal of obtaining a sample that would
be demographically similar to the Hungarian population
in terms of gender, age, level of education and type
of settlement. However, the sample we obtained was
higher in terms of age and education than the population
as a whole.
Data were collected as part of an omnibus survey,3 and
measures for the current researchwere preceded by demo-
graphic items and a number of questions about emotion
regulation strategies (not reported here). A total of 1144
respondents began the survey, but only 886 completed
the entire survey. Missing data analysis using the Little
MCAR test suggested that data were missing completely
at random (𝜒2(2) = 3.36, p = .186). The language of the
questionnaire was Hungarian, and the same method of
translation and back-translation was used for unpublished
scales, as in Study 1.
Participants
Fifty-six per cent of the respondents were women and
41% men; nearly 3% declined to indicate their gender
or responded as “Other.” The mean age of participants
was 49.4 years (SD = 17.87), 24% were from Budapest,
51.7% from other cities, and 19.1% from villages, while
5% selected the “other” option to describe their settle-
ment (most frequently county capitals were mentioned
here). 43.4% completed a university degree, 44.1% more
had secondary education, 10.6% VET, and 1.9% had only
primary education or less.
Measures
As in Study 1, we administered Berkics’ (2009) Hun-
garian translation of the Jost et al. (2003) eight-item gen-
eral system justification scale (𝛼 = .85) as well as a new
translation of the Jost and Thompson (2000) 17-item
economic system justification scale (𝛼 = .62). Responses
were provided in both cases on a scale ranging from
1 (“completely disagree”) to 9 (“completely agree”).
We also asked respondents to indicate their subjective
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TABLE 4
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among major variables in Study 2
Scale M (SD) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1 General system justification 1–9 3.40 (1.72) - .517** .312*** −.023 .043 .141***
2 Economic system justification 1–9 4.15 (1.01) - .235*** −.085* .049 .134***
3 Political orientation (left to right) 1–7 4.17 (1.11) - −.160*** −.029 .020
4 Age Years 49.5 (14.9) - .079* −.150***
5 Level of education 1–4 3.29 (0.73) - .295***
6 SES 1–5 2.30 (1.12) -
Note. *p < .05, ***p < .001.
socio-economic status on a scale ranging from 1 (“much
below the average”) to 5 (“much above the average”).
Respondents indicated their political orientation
using a left–right ideological self-placement scale that
ranged from 1 (“extreme left”) to 7 (“extreme right”).
We also asked respondents which political party they
would vote for if elections were to be held on the
upcoming Sunday. We listed the name of nine par-
ties that were eligible for parliamentary elections at
the time of the data collection (see Appendix), along
with the response options of “other” and “I would
not vote”.
For the purposes of quantitative analyses (and to
maximise statistical power), we compared three groups:
(a) supporters of Fidesz and their coalition partner, the
Christian Democratic Party (coded as a dummy variable:
1 = Fidesz or Christian Democratic Party, 0 = all other
parties; 21.4% of the sample), (b) supporters of Jobbik
(coded as 1 = Jobbik, 0 = all other parties; 11.9% of the
sample), and (c) supporters of liberal and leftist parties
(including liberal, centrist, Socialist and Green parties,
coded as 1 = all liberal and leftist parties, 0 = Fidesz,
Christian Democratic Party and Jobbik; 34.3% of the
sample).4
Respondents were also asked to indicate their “least
liked group” in response to the following prompt: “Be-
low is a list of various groups in Hungarian society
that some people find objectionable. Which of these
groups do you like the least?” Eight groups were listed
that were deemed relevant to the Hungarian politi-
cal context at the time of data collection (see list in
Table 6).
4The data for Study 2 were collected 1 year before the 2018 election, in which Fidesz received 49% of the votes, Jobbik received 19%, and the
left-green-liberal opposition received 22%. Clearly, the percentages we obtained were quite discrepant from the actual election results. There may be
several explanations for this, including the fact that an entire year elapsed between the time of data collection and the election. In addition, we included
support for parties that failed to receive at least 5% of the vote, which are not tallied in official results. Finally, as we noted above, our sample was
higher in terms of age and education than the population as a whole.
Results
Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among major
study variables are shown in Table 4. Overall, respondents
scored slightly below the scale midpoint in terms of both
general and economic system justification, hinting at a
general sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo. They
also scored slightly above the scale midpoint in terms of
left–right orientation. As hypothesized, rightists tended
to score higher than leftists on both general (r = .312,
p < .001) and economic (r = .235, p < .001) forms of
system justification. Subjective SES was positively asso-
ciated with both forms of system justification (rs = .141
and .134, respectively, both ps< .001). Once again,
rightists were slightly younger than leftists (r =−.150,
p < .001).
As in Study 1, we considered the possibility that there
would be a curvilinear association between left–right
ideology and system justification. As shown in Figure 3,
we observed a very slight drop in general system justi-
fication at the extreme right-wing end of the ideological
self-placement scale. This pattern is consistent with
results obtained by Caricati (2019) in several European
countries (but not in Hungary or Poland). However,
the quadratic model (R2 = .098) explained very little
additional variance (ΔR2 = .001), in comparison with the
linear model (R2 = .098). Although Figure 3 hints at the
possible existence of a rise in general system justification
among extreme leftists, this observation should not be
taken too seriously, because it is based on data from only
three (of six) respondents who identified themselves as
extreme leftists.
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Figure 3. Scatter plot with linear and quadratic associations between left–right ideological self-placement and general system justification in Study 2.
For the sake of completeness, we also considered
the possibility that there would be a curvilinear asso-
ciation between left–right ideology and economic sys-
tem justification. As shown in Figure 4, the association
was generally a monotonic one. However, there was a
very small quadratic effect suggesting that the associa-
tion between ideology and economic system justification
flattened out at the extreme values of right-wing orienta-
tion (R2 = .060), resulting in a slight increase in explained
variance (ΔR2 = .005) when compared to a linear associ-
ation (R2 = .055).
For purely descriptive purposes, we have also illus-
trated the relationship between political party support and
ideological variables in Figure 5. As expected, support-
ers of Fidesz and Jobbik identified themselves as more
right-wing than supporters of the Socialist Party, Green
Party and the liberal-democratic coalition. Supporters of
Fidesz and Jobbik also scored higher on both general and
economic system justification than the other three groups,
and Fidesz supporters scored higher on both forms of sys-
tem justification than Jobbik supporters. Fidesz support-
ers scored especially high on general system justification,
relative to supporters of other parties. The two most reli-
gious groups were Fidesz supporters and, somewhat sur-
prisingly, Socialist supporters. Results of post hoc Tukey
tests of multiple comparisons are presented in Table 10.
As in Study 1, we conducted a multiple hierarchical
regression analysis in which left–right ideological orien-
tation was used to predict system justification after adjust-
ing for the effects of age, education and subjective SES.
With respect to general system justification, we observed
that respondents who were higher in terms of subjec-
tive SES scored higher than respondents who were lower
in subjective SES (ß = .15, t = 4.26, p < .001). Over-
all, the three demographic variables accounted for only
1.9% of variance (R2 = 0.02, F(3, 881) = 6.77, p < .001).
Adding left–right political orientation in the second
step of the model significantly increased the amount
of variance explained (ΔR2 = 0.10, F(1, 880) = 97.04,
p < .001). In the combined model, both subjective SES
(ß = .15, t = 4.39, p < .000) and right-wing orientation
(ß = .32, t = 9.85, p < .001) were positively associated
with general system justification, after adjusting for other
variables (see Table 5, top two panels). Total explained
variance was 11.6%, F(4, 880) = 29.89, p < .001.
With respect to economic system justification,
subjective SES was again the only significant pre-
dictor in the first step of the model (ß = .14, t = 3.96,
p < .001), explaining 2.6% of the variance (R2 = 0.03,
F(3, 881) = 8.80, p < .001). Adding political orien-
tation in the second step of the model increased the
amount of variance explained by 5% (ΔR2 = 0.05, F(1,
880) = 48.63, p < .001). In the combined model, sub-
jective SES (ß = .14, t = 4.03, p < .001), and right-wing
orientation (ß = .23, t = 6.97, p < .001) were both posi-
tively associated with economic system justification, after
adjusting for other variables (see Table 5, bottom two
panels). Overall, this model explained a modest amount
of variance in economic system justification (R2 = 0.08,
F(4, 880) = 19.11, p < .001).
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Figure 4. Scatter plot with linear and quadratic associations between left–right ideological self-placement and economic system justification in
Study 2.
Figure 5. Mean levels of system justification, ideological self-placement, and religiosity as a function of political party preferences in Study 2
In Table 6, we present the results of an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) in which we compare supporters of
Fidesz, Jobbik, and liberal/leftist parties (see Appendix
for additional information pertaining to post-hoc compar-
isons of means). Supporters of Jobbik were younger and
less educated than the other two groups, but there were
no differences in subjective SES among the three groups.
Supporters of Fidesz and Jobbik did indeed identify them-
selves as more right-wing than supporters of the other par-
ties, but they did not differ significantly from one another.
Supporters of Fidesz scored significantly higher in terms
of general and economic forms of system justification, in
comparison with the other two groups. Supporters of Job-
bik scored significantly higher than supporters of liberal
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TABLE 5
Results of a hierarchical regression model investigating the effect of left–right political orientation on general system justification beliefs
(top panels) and economic system justification beliefs (bottom panels) in Study 2
95% CI
Predictor B SE t p 𝛽 Lower Upper
Step 1 Outcome variable: General system justification
Intercept 2.87 .34 8.57 <.001
Age .00 .00 .02 .988 .00 −.01 .01
Education −.01 .09 −.06 .953 .00 −.18 .17
SES .23 .05 4.26 <.001 .15 .13 .34
Step 2
Intercept .49 .40 1.22 .223
Age .01 .00 1.53 .126 .05 .00 .01
Education .01 .08 .16 .872 .01 −.15 .18
SES .23 .05 4.39 <.001 .15 .13 .33
Political Orientation (left to right) .49 .05 9.85 <.001 .32 .39 .59
Step 1 Outcome variable: Economic system justification
Intercept 3.96 .19 20.62 <.001
Age .00 .00 −1.94 .053 −.07 −.01 .00
Education .03 .05 .69 .489 .02 −.06 .13
SES .12 .03 3.97 <.001 .14 .06 .19
Step 2
Intercept 2.97 .24 12.63 <.001
Age .00 .00 −.89 .372 −.03 −.01 .00
Education .04 .05 .87 .386 .03 −.05 .14
SES .12 .03 4.01 <.001 .14 .06 .18
Political orientation (left to right) .20 .03 6.97 <.001 .23 .15 .26
TABLE 6
Comparison of demographic and psychological variables among supporters of different parties
Liberal/left parties M (SD) Fidesz M (SD) Jobbik M (SD) F Df p ηp2
Age (years) 51.48a (15.16) 48.85a (13.59) 43.85b (13.15) 10.28 2563 <.001 .35
Education 3.45a (0.66) 3.38a (.68) 3.00b (.70) 18.00 2595 <.001 .06
SES 2.39 (1.12) 2.45 (1.10) 2.16 (1.12) 2.37 2595 .095 .01
Political orientation (left to right) 3.45a (0.84) 4.97b (0.93) 5.20b (1.26) 214.22 2595 <.001 .42
General system justification 2.54a (1.15) 5.40b (1.59) 2.91c (1.28) 280.67 2595 <.001 .49
Economic system justification 3.86a (1.02) 4.74b (0.86) 4.09a (0.96) 51.52 2595 <.001 .15
Note. Different subscripts indicate significant differences between the groups.
and leftist parties on general system justification but not
economic system justification. Thus, supporters of liberal
and leftist parties scored lowest on both forms of sys-
tem justification, but the difference between their scores
and those of Jobbik supporters was statistically significant
only with respect to general system justification.
We also conducted a multiple regression analysis in
which political party preferences (rather than left–right
political orientation per se) were used to predict (a)
general system justification and (b) economic system
justification after (c) adjusting for the effects of age,
education and subjective SES (see Table 7). Respondents
who were higher in subjective SES again scored higher
in terms of general system justification, although the
three demographic variables only explained 2.1% of
the variance, F(3, 874) = 6.12, p < .001. Adding party
preferences to the second step of the model greatly
increased the amount of variance explained (ΔR2 = 0.38,
F(3, 869) = 181.05, p < .001). Supporters of Fidesz
scored significantly higher than the other two groups in
terms of general system justification (ß = .52, t = 17.25,
p < .001), whereas supporters of liberal and leftist parties
scored significantly lower than the other two groups
(ß =−.18, t = 5.91, p < .001). Support for Jobbik was
unrelated to general system justification in this model,
which explained a significant amount of variance overall
(R2 = 0.39, F(6, 869) = 95.48, p < .001).
With respect to economic system justification, people
who were high in subjective SES tended to score higher
than those who were low in subjective SES, although
the amount of variance explained by demographic vari-
ables was small (R2 = 0.026, F(3, 874) = 8.70, p < .001).
Adding party preferences to the second step of the
model significantly increased the amount of variance
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TABLE 7
Results of a hierarchical regression model investigating the effects of political party preferences on general (top panels) and economic
(bottom panels) system justification in Study 2
95% CI
Predictor B SE T p 𝛽 Lower Upper
Step 1 Outcome variable: General system justification
Intercept 2.93 .33 8.77 <.001
Age .01 .00 −.42 .967 −.01 −.01 .01
Education −.02 .09 −.19 .847 −.01 −.19 .15
SES .22 .06 4.07 <.001 .15 .12 .33
Step 2
Intercept 2.67 0.28 9.69 <.001
Age .01 .00 .63 .529 .08 −.01 .01
Education .01 .07 −.01 .999 .00 −.14 .14
SES .18 .04 4.15 <.001 .13 .09 .26
Fidesz 2.19 .18 17.25 <.001 .52 1.94 2.43
Jobbik −.25 .15 −1.65 .100 −.05 −.56 .05
Liberal/left parties −.66 .11 −5.91 <.001 −.18 −.87 −.44
Step 1 Outcome variable: Economic system justification
Intercept 3.98 .19 20.58 <.001
Age −.01 .00 1.99 .047 −.07 −.00 .00
Education .03 .05 .64 .516 .02 −.06 .13
SES .12 .03 3.94 <.001 .14 .06 .19
Step 2
Intercept 3.87 .19 20.17 <.001
Age −.01 .00 −1.65 .099 −.05 −.01 .00
Education .05 .05 0.93 .351 .32 −.05 .14
SES .11 .03 3.75 <.001 .13 .05 .17
Fidesz .64 .88 7.23 <.001 .26 .46 .81
Jobbik −.20 .11 −0.19 .851 −.07 −.23 .19
Liberal/left parties −.24 .77 −3.14 .002 −.12 −.40 −.09
TABLE 8
Selection of “least liked groups” as a function of political party support
Liberal/left parties Fidesz Jobbik Total
Count % 𝜒2 p Count % 𝜒2 p Count % 𝜒2 p Count %
Refugees 18 6.25 16.00 <.001 37 20.1 19.10 <.001 12 11.32 .01 .920 67 11.59
Roma 69 23.96 4.33 .038 38 20.7 6.97 .008 54 50.94 34.46 <.001 161 27.85
Economic immigrants 15 5.21 5.29 .021 22 12.0 6.55 .010 8 7.55 .01 .920 45 7.79
Muslims 10 3.47 26.32 <.001 31 16.8 14.82 <.001 16 15.09 4.00 .046 57 9.86
Gays, lesbians 7 2.43 11.49 .001 20 10.9 13.32 <.001 6 5.66 .00 .984 33 5.71
Football hooligans 169 58.68 113.42 <.001 36 19.6 35.88 <.001 10 9.43 42.77 <.001 215 37.20
Total 288 100 184 100 106 100 578 100
explained (ΔR2 = 0.103, F(3, 869) = 34.50, p < .001).
Supporters of Fidesz scored significantly higher than the
other two groups in terms of economic system justifi-
cation (ß = .26, t = 7.23, p < .001), whereas supporters
of liberal and leftist parties scored significantly lower
than the other two groups (ß =−.12, t =−3.14, p = .002).
Support for Jobbik was unrelated to economic system
justification in the combined model, which explained a
significant amount of variance overall (R2 = 0.126, F(6,
865) = 22.10, p < .001).
We conducted an exploratory analysis of responses
to the question about “least liked groups” to determine
whether leftists and rightists in Hungary were equally
likely to display ethnocentric intolerance and prejudice.
Supporters of Fidesz were most likely to cite the Roma,
refugees and football hooligans as their least liked groups
(see Table 8). To a lesser extent, they also disliked eco-
nomic immigrants and gay men and lesbians. Support-
ers of Jobbik overwhelmingly cited the Roma as their
least liked group, followed by Muslims, refugees and
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football hooligans (in much smaller numbers). Support-
ers of liberal and leftist parties were most likely to select
football hooligans as their least liked group, followed by
the Roma.
To compare the frequency of choices by party prefer-
ences, we analysed the least liked groups that were chosen
by at least 10 respondents from one of the three groups
of respondents. This left us with six outgroups: refugees,
Roma, economic immigrants, Muslims, gays/lesbians and
football hooligans. According to a Pearson’s chi-square
analysis, choices of least liked groups were not identical
for different groups of respondents (𝜒2 (1, 10) = 161.53,
p < .001). We therefore conducted a contingency table
analysis to determine whether the choice of specific
out-groups was higher than expected following a pro-
cedure recommended by Beasley and Schumacker
(1995). The results of the analysis are summarised
in Table 8.
Fidesz supporters were significantly more likely than
would be expected by chance (given the choices of all
three respondent groups) to identify refugees, Muslims
and gay men and lesbians, and they were less likely
to identify football hooligans as their least liked group
(using the Bonferroni corrected p value of .003). Jobbik
supporters were significantly more likely than would
be expected by chance to identify the Roma as their
least liked group, and they were less likely to iden-
tify football hooligans. Supporters of liberal and leftist
parties were more likely than would be expected by
chance to identify football hooligans as their least liked
group, and they were less likely to identify refugees,
Muslims and gays and lesbians. (The directions of
these differences were established by inspecting the
signs of the adjusted residuals from the chi-square
analysis).
Discussion
In Study 2, we again obtained results consistent with
the notion that the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis does
indeed hold in the contemporary Hungarian context.
Although respondents did, on average, score below the
scale midpoint on both general and economic system jus-
tification measures, it would be an exaggeration to con-
clude that Hungarians today are “system-derogating,” as
Kelemen et al. (2014) argued. Furthermore, individuals
who identified themselves as rightist (vs. leftist) in polit-
ical terms and supporters of the two major right-wing
parties, Fidesz and Jobbik, scored significantly higher in
terms of general and economic system justification—in
contrast to the strong conclusions reached by Kele-
men et al. (2014) and Lönnqvist et al. (2019). Rightists
also expressed more negative attitudes than leftists with
respect to the Roma, religious minorities (especiallyMus-
lims) and sexual minorities.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Results obtained in the two studies we conducted yield
substantive conclusions that are very different from those
reached by Kelemen et al. (2014) and Lönnqvist et al.
(2019). Consistent with research conducted in other set-
tings (e.g., Jost, 2017, 2019; Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b,
2008, 2009), we observed that rightists in Hungary scored
higher than leftists on personal needs for order and struc-
ture and that supporters of the two major right-wing
parties, Fidesz and Jobbik, scored significantly higher
in terms of both general and economic forms of sys-
tem justification, in comparison with supporters of the
liberal-democratic coalition, the Socialist Party and the
Green Party. Furthermore, these differences in terms of
political psychology held even after adjusting for parti-
san and ideological differences in terms of age, education,
and SES.
One clear explanation for the differences between our
results and those reported in previous studies of politi-
cal psychology in Hungary is that the political context
shifted in important ways between 2010—when the sur-
vey data analysed by Kelemen et al. (2014) and Lön-
nqvist et al. (2019) were in fact collected—and 2014
(when the data from our first study was collected) and
2017 (when the data from our second study was col-
lected). By 2014, Fidesz had clearly solidified its power,
beginning its second term in government in possession
of two-thirds of all seats in Parliament. At this point,
Fidesz aggressively attacked independent media organ-
isations and eroded democratic institutions in a number
of ways. Thus, their party was firmly in power, and their
motivation to defend and justify the status quo would have
been very high for reasons of collective self-interest (or
group justification).
At that point in time, Jobbik remained an opposition
party but it managed to maintain a relatively high level of
support, especially given that it was still a very new party.
In response to the public’s concerns about increasing
authoritarianism and the right-wing populism of Fidesz,
Jobbik leaders attempted to move their party to the centre,
dropping its openly hostile rhetoric toward Roma peo-
ple (Krekó & Juhász, 2018). According to results from
the European Social Survey, by 2016 there were no dif-
ferences in terms of left–right ideological self-placement
between supporters of Fidesz and Jobbik (ESS, 2016),
although Jobbik had originally sought to challenge Fidesz
from the right.
During this same period, liberal, leftist and Green par-
ties struggled to construct a unified opposition; their sup-
port waned throughout the country. In 2017, at the time of
our second data collection, Viktor Orbán’s self-described
“illiberal democracy” was fully established and backed by
authoritarian and right-wing populist leaders around the
world, but there were no significant changes in terms of
support for the opposition (see Krekó & Enyedi, 2018).
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To recap, in 2010—the year of the survey analysed by
Kelemen et al. (2014) and Lönnqvist et al. (2019)—both
of the right-wing parties were in opposition to the social-
ist government. By 2017, however, one of the right-wing
parties was firmly in power, and the other had become the
second most popular party in the country.
Another difference between our research program and
earlier work by Kelemen et al. (2014) and Lönnqvist et al.
(2019) is that we administered complete system justifi-
cation scales and a complete subscale used to measure
personal needs for order and structure, whereas they pre-
sented results based on composites of a relatively few
selected items after dropping some items based on the
results of factor analyses. In light of growingmethodolog-
ical concerns associated with the use of ad hoc measures
and individual items (Flake & Fried, 2019; Flake, Pek, &
Hehman, 2017; Hussey&Hughes, 2018; Pietryka&Mac-
intosh, 2017), we believe that it is preferable to administer
and analyse data based on complete scales. In this sense,
conclusions based on our analyses may bemore solid than
those reached in previous research on political psychol-
ogy in Hungary.
At the same time, there are clear limitations of our
research. For one thing, we administered only one mea-
sure of cognitive rigidity and no direct measures of
authoritarianism. For another, we were not able to distin-
guish between social and economic dimensions of ideol-
ogy (Azevedo, Jost, Rothmund, & Sterling, 2019), nor did
we investigate other psychological differences between
leftists and rightists in terms of personality and other
characteristics, such as existential motivation (Jost, 2017).
Future research would do well to incorporate multiple
instruments to more systematically catalogue the nature
of ideological symmetries and asymmetries in the context
of Central and Eastern Europe.
With respect to out-group attitudes, exploratory anal-
yses provided no evidence that liberals and leftists in
Hungary were equally prejudiced and intolerant, in com-
parison with rightists—as several authors have claimed
in the context of Western politics (e.g., Brandt, 2017;
Brandt et al., 2014; Crawford, 2012; Crawford & Pilan-
ski, 2014; Wetherell et al., 2013). On the contrary, right-
ists consistently expressed more hostility than leftists
toward out-group members who are often mistreated in
the Hungarian context, including the Roma people, reli-
gious minorities (especially Muslims but also Jews), and
sexual minorities (gay men and lesbians). When liber-
als and leftists were asked to identify their “least liked
group,” they overwhelmingly chose football hooligans,
which is not a group that suffers a great deal of intol-
erance or persecution in Hungarian society. There was
indeed evidence that some leftists also disliked the Roma,
but they did not dislike them as intensely as rightists did.
The relative dearth of intolerance and prejudice expressed
by leftists in contemporary Hungary may be surprising to
some readers, given the nation’s Communist legacy. Nev-
ertheless, our findings are in line with previous research,
which shows that right-wing authoritarianism is a strong
predictor of the tendency to justify the use of violence
against the Roma, Jews and sexual minorities (as well
as banks, politicians and multinational companies) in the
contemporary Hungarian context (Bartlett et al., 2012;
Bernát et al., 2013; Faragó et al., 2019; Krekó et al.,
2011).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In our view, Kelemen et al. (2014) and Lönnqvist et al.
(2019) deserve credit for drawing attention to the fact that
upstart right-wing parties (like Jobbik) can sometimes
appeal to young, even highly educated people by pre-
senting themselves as anti-elitist and anti-establishment.
Similar dynamics may be at work in Italy and the U.K.,
with the sudden rise of right-wing populists such as Mat-
teo Salvini and Nigel Farage, respectively. In the after-
math of the refugee crisis of 2015, a number of European
leaders have managed to gain power and influence by
attacking establishment parties for failing to tighten the
borders. However, none of this should be confused with
open-mindedness or a desire to rectify past injustices.
Rightists in Hungary—as in Italy and the U.K. and many
other countries—are indeed more cognitively rigid, more
prejudiced and intolerant, and more system-justifying
both in general and with respect to the current economic
system than are their counterparts on the left (Jost, 2017,
2019). Rumours of the death of the rigidity-of-the-right
hypothesis (e.g., Brandt et al., 2014; Conway III et al.,
2018; Lönnqvist et al., 2019; Malka & Soto, 2015), in
other words, have been greatly exaggerated. One can only
hope that research programs such as this one will not only
deepen our understanding of why some people—but not
others—appear to be captivated by the image of an “illib-
eral democracy,” as in the case of Hungary, but will also
point the way to an alternative, more just, more tolerant,
and more truly democratic state of affairs in Central and
Eastern Europe.
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